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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 17-3303 
________________ 
 
JAMES MARTIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
GNC HOLDINGS, INC.; JOSEPH M. FORTUNATO; MICHAEL M. NUZZO; 
ANDREW S. DREXLER; MICHAEL G. ARCHBOLD; TRICIA K. TOLIVAR; 
PATRICK A. FORTUNE 
 
KBC Asset Mangment NV, 
                      Appellant 
 
   ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-15-cv-01522) 
District Judge: Honorable Mark R. Hornak  
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 21, 2018 
 
Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ, and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 11, 2018) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and under I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge 
KBC Asset Management NV appeals the district court’s dismissal of the class 
action complaint it filed alleging securities fraud. The complaint alleged various 
misrepresentations in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
19341 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.2  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm.3  
I.   
Seven statements made to investors by former GNC executives Archbold and 
Fortunato are at issue in this appeal.4 The district court assumed that these statements 
were misrepresentations as alleged. The court also assumed that each was “material” 
because there was “a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider 
[them] important in deciding how to [act].”5 The district court nevertheless found the 
plaintiffs could not state a claim because they had not adequately pled the required 
elements of scienter and loss causation. It therefore dismissed the complaint. This appeal 
followed. 
II. 
                                              
1 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
3 The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction over 
this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
4 The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that several other statements made by defendants other 
than Fortunato and Archbold were also actionable under § 10(b). The district court found 
that the statements were either not material, or were exempt under the act’s safe harbor 
provision. The plaintiffs did not appeal this determination.  
5 Martin v. GNC Holdings, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01522, 2017 WL 3974002, at *10 (W.D. Pa. 
2017) (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
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 To make out a securities fraud claim under 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), a plaintiff must 
allege: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection 
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) 
reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss 
causation.6 Only the elements of scienter and loss causation are at issue in this appeal. 
Because we agree that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead scienter, we need not address 
their arguments concerning loss causation.7 
 “Scienter is a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”8  
A plaintiff alleging scienter must assert facts giving rise to a strong inference of reckless 
or conscious behavior.9 “A reckless statement is one involving not merely simple, or even 
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, 
and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the 
defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.”10 
                                              
6 Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). 
7 See Edward J. Goodman Life Income Trust v. Jabil Circuit, Inc., 594 F.3d 783, 789–90 
(11th Cir. 2010) (“Because we agree with the district court’s conclusion about the 
insufficient inference of scienter raised by the complaint, we need not address its 
conclusion on loss causation.”).  
8 Institutional Inv’rs Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 252 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ernst 
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976)).  
9 Id. at 267 (quoting In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d 525, 534–35 (3d Cir. 1999)).  
10 Id. at 267 n.42 (quoting Advanta, 180 F.3d at 535). Advanta noted that applying the 
recklessness standard in the securities fraud context promotes the “policy objectives of 
discouraging deliberate ignorance and preventing defendants from escaping liability solely 
because of the difficulty of proving conscious intent to commit fraud.” Advanta, 180 F.3d 
at 535. 
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To determine if allegations in a complaint satisfy the scienter requirement we 
engage in a three part analysis.11 First, we accept all factual allegations in the complaint 
as true.12 Next, we determine “whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give 
rise to a strong inference of scienter, not whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in 
isolation, meets that standard.”13  Finally, to determine whether the allegations give rise 
to a “strong” inference of scienter, we “take into account plausible opposing 
inferences.”14 That is, we must consider “plausible, nonculpable explanations for the 
defendant’s conduct, as well as inferences favoring the plaintiff.”15 An inference that a 
defendant acted with scienter need not be irrefutable.16 However, it must be more than 
merely “reasonable or permissible—it must be cogent and compelling.”17 A securities 
fraud complaint will therefore only survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if “a reasonable 
person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any 
opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”18  
Having applied this analysis, we agree with the district court’s determination that 
the plaintiffs did not adequately plead scienter. The complaint contains no allegations that 
Fortunato or Archbold knew that GNC’s DMAA-replacement products may have 
contained ingredients banned by the FDA, or that they received any report that banned 
                                              
11 Tellabs Inc. v. Major Issues and Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007). 
12 Id. at 322. 
13 Id. at 322–23. 
14 Id. at 323. 
15 Id. at 324. 
16 Id. 
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
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substances may be included in replacement supplements. Rather, the complaint vaguely 
alleges that the reports “stimulated significant concern and discussion within GNC” and 
that they were “widely distributed throughout GNC headquarters.”19 At bottom, the 
plaintiffs did not “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant[s] acted with the required state of mind.”20 
For the same reasons, we cannot divine scienter from the information provided by 
confidential witnesses. The district court correctly applied the particularity requirement by 
evaluating the “‘detail provided by the confidential sources, the sources’ basis of 
knowledge . . . [and] the corroborative nature of other facts alleged.”21 In short, the 
plaintiffs did not explain how the confidential witnesses obtained the information included 
in the complaint. Nor did the confidential witnesses provide specific facts about Fortunato 
and Archbold learning of the potentially tainted products prior to making the actionable 
statements.  
Similarly, we reject the plaintiffs’ argument that they satisfied the “core operations” 
doctrine. Under that theory, a plaintiff may be entitled to a “core operations inference” if 
the complaint alleges that a defendant made misstatements concerning the “core matters” 
of central importance to a company.22 We agree with the district court’s assessment that 
the core operation doctrine does not support a finding of scienter here, “absent some 
                                              
19 App. 101, 103. 
20 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A). 
21 Avaya, 564 F.3d at 263 (quoting Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 
F.3d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 2004)).  
22 Id. at 268. 
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additional allegation of specific information conveyed to management and related to the 
fraud.”23 
Finally, we hold that certain stock sales were not indicative of scienter.24 Only two 
of the six defendants sold stock during the relevant time period, and only one of them made 
a statement that is the subject of this appeal. The plaintiffs failed to plead specific facts to 
demonstrate that the circumstances surrounding the sale of stock by Fortunato were 
“unusual in scope or timing.”2526 
III.  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the district court and the 
court’s analysis as explained in its very well-reasoned and thorough opinion.27  
                                              
23 Id. at 270 (quoting Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1068 
(9th Cir. 2008)).  
24 We need not decide whether the “corporate” or “collective” scienter doctrine is a viable 
theory because the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to establish GNC's 
scienter. 
25 In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 277 (3d Cir. 2006).  
26 Because the district court correctly dismissed the 10b-5 claim, the derivative § 20(a) 
claim necessarily fails. 
27 See Martin v. GNC Holdings, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01522, 2017 WL 3974002, at *11–18 
(W.D. Pa. 2017). 
